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Air France v. Saks:
The Applicability of the Warsaw Convention to a
Passenger Injury Sustained During a Routine
International Flight
The liability of an air carrier for injuries sustained by passengers
in the course of international air travel is governed by the Warsaw
Convention.' Article 17 of this treaty permits recovery if an "acci-
dent"0 causes injury to the passenger.2 In Air France v. Saks3 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue whether the normal operation of
an aircraft's pressurization system, which allegedly caused a passen-
ger's deafness, qualified as an accident under article 17 of the War-
saw Convention.4
In holding that the carrier was not liable for the traveler's in-
jury,5 the Court construes the article 17 accident provision as appli-
cable only to events which are unusual or unexpected. This note will
analyze the Supreme Court's interpretation of article 17 in light of
the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention and other court
decisions defining the liability of air carriers under this treaty.
In Air France the passenger, Valerie Saks, was on board an air-
craft en route from Paris to Los Angeles. 6 As the plane began its
descent, Saks experienced pain and pressure in her left ear. The air-
craft's pressurization system was operating normally at the time.
The plane landed and Saks disembarked. Five days later, a doctor
concluded that Saks had suffered permanent deafness in her left
ear.
7
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) [here-
inafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2 Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by the passen-
ger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
3 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
4 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1341.
5 Id. at 1345.
6 This flight qualifies as international transportation as defined in the Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
7 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1340.
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In a personal injury suit filed against Air France, Saks claimed
that deafness caused by normal pressurization changes was an acci-
dent within the meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
The plaintiff defined accident as a risk of air travel and claimed that
the potential for pressure changes causing hearing loss was such a
hazard.8
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Air France's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that Saks had not sustained her burden of proving that
an accident had caused her injury.9 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that pressurization of an aircraft
does fit the definition of "aircraft accident" as that term is used in
the aviation context.' 0 In reaching its decision, the court empha-
sized that the trend is to construe broadly the accident provision of
article 17 to afford greater protection to passengers." As a policy
consideration, the court noted that an air carrier is in the best posi-
tion to allocate efficiently the costs of liability for passenger
injuries. I 2
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that an
injury resulting from the normal operation of an airplane's pressuri-
zation system is not covered by the accident provision of article 17.13
In defining the term "accident" as used in this international air
treaty, the Court looked to the text of the Convention. Speaking for
the majority, Justice O'Connor reasoned that because the drafters
used the word "accident" in the article 17 provision dealing with
passenger injuries' 4 and "occurrence" to apply to damage to bag-
gage under article 18,' 5 they intended these terms to have different
8 Id.
9 The court defined accident as an "unusual or unexpected" occurrence and found
that the normal operation of a plane's pressurization system does not fit within this defini-
tion. Id.
10 Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1338
(1985). The court of appeals defined aircraft accident as "an occurrence associated with
the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the
aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked .... " Notifi-
cation and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and Preser-
vation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records, 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1977). A
change in the pressurization system in an aircraft during flight would be such an
occurrence.
I I Saks, 724 F.2d at 1387. In support of this proposition, the court cited cases which
have held that hijackings and terrorist attacks are accidents within the meaning of article
17. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc);
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.), ald, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1972).
12 Saks, 724 F.2d at 1387.
13 Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (1985).
1 Warsaw Convention, supm note 1, art. 17.
15 Id. art. 18.
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meanings. 16
Because the Convention was written in French, the Court also
considered the French legal definition of accident. 17 This term is
defined as "a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended
event" l8-a meaning consistent with the negotiating history of the
treaty,19 the conduct of the parties subsequent to the adoption of the
treaty,20 and other court decisions interpreting this term.2 1 Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded that to establish an accident, a mere risk
of air travel is not enough. An external event, which is unusual or
unexpected, must cause the passenger's injury.22 The evidence in
Air France indicated that the changes in air pressure as the aircraft
descended were normal. Thus, Saks was denied recovery for deaf-
ness caused by her "own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of the aircraft."'23
Because the text of the Warsaw Convention provides little gui-
dance to the drafters' intended meaning of the term, "accident," the
Supreme Court in Air France looked to extrinsic evidence. Generally,
the Court liberally construes the terms of a treaty.24 Important fac-
16 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1341. Based on this distinction between accident and oc-
currence, the Court was critical of the court of appeals' conclusion that the two terms had
identical meanings. Id. at 1342. The Supreme Court noted that the lower court's defini-
tion of accident applies to accident investigations and not to article 17 injuries and liabil-
ity. Id. at 1346.
17 Id. at 1343. See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (legally binding meaning of Warsaw Conven-
tion provisions is French meaning). See also Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 54
(1962) (terms of treaty should be given ordinary meaning unless contrary intent shown).
For helpful background on the rules of treaty interpretation, see generally A. McNAIR,
THE LAWS OF TREATIES (1961).
18 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1343.
19 The Court analyzed the work of the drafting committee in formulating the text of
articles 17 and 18. They concluded from these negotiations and the various changes made
in the text that "a passenger's injury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must
mean something different than an 'occurrence' on the plane." Id. at 1343, 1344.
20 Id. at 1343. The Court referred specifically to an air law conference held in Guate-
mala City in 1971 in which an amendment to article 17 was approved by some member
nations (although not the United States). This amendment inserted the term "event" in
place of "accident" to broaden the scope of an air carrier's liability to injured passengers.
This change in terminology implies that an accident has a more narrow meaning than
event. Id. at 1344. For the text of this amendment, see A Protocol to Amend the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Pertaining to International Carriage by Air, Mar.
1971, ICAO Doc. 8932 [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
21 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1344. The Court cited several decisions in support of its
definition of "accident." See Air France v. Haddad, Judgment of June 19, 1979, Cour
d'appel, Paris, 1979, 1979 Revue Francaise de Droit A~rien 327, af'd, Judgment of Feb.
16, 1982, Cour de Cassation, Paris, 1982 Bull. Civ. I 63; Abramson v.Japan Airlines Co.,
739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1776 (1985); McDonald v. Air Can., 439
F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); Scherer v. Pan Am. World Airways, 54 A.D.2d 636, 387
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1976).
22 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1345.
23 Id. at 1346.
24 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 531, at 1479 (2d ed. 1945). See Choctaw Nation
of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 (1942).
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tors in treaty interpretation are the intent of the parties2 5 and the
negotiating history, prior and subsequent to the treaty.26 To under-
stand more fully the Court's interpretation of article 17, a brief chro-
nology of the history of the Warsaw Convention is necessary.27
The two major goals of the Warsaw Convention 28 drafters were
to create a uniform body of law for claims arising in the course of
international air transportation and to place a monetary limit on car-
riers' liability to passengers for injuries suffered during such travel.29
Of primary concern was a desire to stabilize economically the airline
industry, which was still in its infancy.30 The United States, in ratify-
ing this treaty, expressed its commitment to these objectives.3 1
Although the protection of a developing air transportation in-
dustry32 was a major aim at the time the Warsaw Convention was
adopted, this goal became less significant as time passed. By 1955
air travel was a multi-billion dollar business 3 and increasing empha-
sis was placed on providing adequate protection to passengers.3 4
The United States expressed dissatisfaction with the limits of
25 Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977).
See also A. McNAIR, supra note 17, at 365 (intent of parties must be considered in light of all
relevant factors).
26 2 C. HYDE, supra note 24, § 534, at 1497. See Day, 528 F.2d at 31, 35 (conduct of
parties after treaty ratification aids in interpreting its provisions); Warshaw v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 411 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (parties' subsequent interpretations
reveal intent in matters not anticipated at time of Convention); Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at
702, 707 (subsequent conduct of parties relevant to treaty interpretation).
27 Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432. See also Block, 386 F.2d at 336 (considerations of
how Convention was conceived and developed are helpful in treaty interpretation).
28 The Warsaw Convention was adopted on October 12, 1929 and officially accepted
by the United States in 1934. Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Carrier Liability for Passenger
Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FoRDHAM L. REV. 369, 370 (1976). For an excellent
general discussion of the background of the Warsaw Convention, see generally Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
29 Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerift: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations
Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 653, 658 (1980).
30 Unlimited liability might impede persons from investing in airlines. Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 499. Furthermore, the economic well being of the airline
industry would be greatly threatened if unlimited liability were imposed in a major air
accident. McDonald, 439 F.2d at 1402, 1406.
31 In his letter to the U.S. Senate recommending ratification of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote, "It is believed that the principle of limitation of
liability will not only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite
basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be an aid in the
development of international air transportation .. " Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. ExEc.
Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
32 In 1929 international air travel was in its beginning stages. Pan American was the
sole international air carrier in the United States and its flights were limited to Cuba. Air
France served as a link between only France, England, and Africa. No flights took place at
night and the maximum speed of carriers was 150 miles an hour. 1 L. KItEiNDLER, AvIA-
-lON AccmrErr LAw § 11.02(2) (1971).
3 Comment, supra note 29, at 661.
34 Note, Maximizing Passenger Remowy Under the Warsaw Convention. Artics 17 and 22,
34 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 141, 148 (1977).
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carrier liability specified in the treaty. s 5 An air conference held at
The Hague in 1955 resulted in the adoption of an increase in carrier
liability from 8,300 U.S. dollars to approximately 16,600 dollars.3
6
The United States did not, however, ratify this amendment.3 7 In the
administration's view, the Hague Protocol did not set liability limits
which would adequately compensate travelers for injuries.3 8
In 1965, as a result of continued discontent with the limits of
liability, the United States gave notice of its denunciation of the War-
saw Convention.3 9 In response to this threatened withdrawal, the
International Air Transportation Association initiated discussions
among various air carriers which resulted in the Montreal Agree-
ment, an interim contract that became effective on May 16, 1966.40
Under the terms of this contract, the limit of an air carrier's liability
for injuries sustained by passengers was raised to 75,000 U.S. dol-
lars.4 1 Additionally, the carrier waived the defense of due care pro-
vided under article 20(1)42 the effect of which was to impose
absolute liability on the carrier if all requirements of the Warsaw
Convention are met. 43 The United States approved this agreement
and withdrew its notice of denunciation. 44 The Montreal Agree-
ment, as a special contract, did not supersede the Warsaw Conven-
tion.45 Instead, it expanded carrier liability and increased passenger
protection in those cases in which the Convention is applicable.
46
Further changes in the liability imposed on air carriers resulted
from an international air conference held in 1971. The Guatemala
Protocol, adopted on March 8, 1971,47 provided that air carriers
35 The liability limit in the original treaty was 8,300 U.S. dollars. Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 22.
36 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929. Done at The Hague on
Sept. 28, 1955, ICAO Doc. 7632, 48 U.N.T.S. 372 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hague
Protocol].
37 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 32, at § 12.01.
38 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 546-47.
39 Dep't of State Press Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923
(1965).
40 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement No. 18,900, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Montreal Agreement].
41 Id.
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(1).
43 Montreal Agreement, supra note 40. This contract applies only to air transporta-
tion to and from the United States. A passenger becomes bound to its terms by "[p]roper
tendering of a ticket combined with reasonable notice of its contents." Comment, supra
note 29, at 669.
44 Federal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
45 The Montreal Agreement contractually changed the tariffs of air carriers. If its
drafters had attempted to amend article 17, its legal effectiveness would be conditioned on
ratification by the U.S. Senate. See Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 400, 408. See also Day, 528
F.2d at 36.
46 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 597.
47 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20.
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would be liable for injuries to passengers up to 100,000 U.S. dol-
lars.48 Of particular significance, this Protocol changed article 17
such that absolute liability would result if an event as opposed to an
accident caused passenger injury during an international flight.4 9
Although the United States signed this Protocol, it has not yet been
ratified by the Senate and, thus, lacks the force of law.50
The foregoing analysis illustrates that adequate passenger pro-
tection has become an important consideration in the context of the
Warsaw Convention and subsequent amendments to this interna-
tional air treaty. Liability against a carrier is not, however, auto-
matic. The Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Montreal
Agreement, continues to be the legally binding treaty governing in-
ternational air transportation. To have a valid claim, therefore, the
accident requirement of article 17 must be met. In interpreting the
meaning of "accident," courts have recognized their duty to ascer-
tain the intent of the treaty drafters while, at the same time, taking
into account policy considerations and legislative action subsequent
to the adoption of the treaty.5 '
Generally, courts have defined accident to mean an undesigned,
unintended, or unexpected event.52 In the context of air transporta-
tion and, specifically, in cases factually similar to Air France, the term
accident has been defined as an unusual or abnormal happening.
In Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,5 for example, a passen-
ger brought suit under the Warsaw Convention for injury to her in-
ner ear resulting from normal cabin repressurization as the aircraft
descended.5 4 The district court initially noted that a causal connec-
tion must be found between the alleged accident and the passenger's
injury.55 In reviewing other decisions interpreting article 17, the
court found that a commonality for carrier liability was "a happening
48 Id.
49 The revised version of article 17 reads:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the case of death or personal
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which caused the
death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable
if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
50 1 L. KREINDLERt, supra note 32, at § 12B.01. See also Topical Survey, Aviation-War-
saw Convention-Air Carrer's Liability for "Accidents" Under Article 17 Defined To Exclude Injury
Caused by Routine Repressunzation ofJet Aircraft, 4 INT'L TRADE LJ. 285 (1979).
51 Topical Survey, supra note 50, at 289.
52 Koehring Co. v. American Auto. Ins., 353 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1965). See also
Ketona Chem. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1969).
53 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
54 Id. at 405.
55 Based on the testimony of a medical expert, the court concluded that although a
cause of the passenger's injury was the cabin repressurization, another contributing factor
was that the passenger had previously undergone a stapendectomy. This factor alone,
however, would not have caused the injury. Id. at 405.
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or an event which in each case was beyond the normal and preferred
mode of operation for the flight." 56 In comparing the term "acci-
dent" in article 17 with "occurrence" in article 18, the court rea-
soned that liability to passengers must be conditioned on a risk of air
travel while liability for damage to baggage can result from the mere
happening of an event.57 After discussing negotiations related to the
Guatemala Protocol, 58 the court concluded that to qualify as an acci-
dent, there must be "an untoward event, out of the ordinary, trig-
gered by some external event." 59 Although the passenger's injury
was caused by an external event, namely, the cabin repressurization,
the accident requirement was not met because the pressure system
was operating in its normal, ordinary manner. 60 Thus, the passenger
was denied recovery under the Warsaw Convention.
In the analogous case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines6'
a passenger suffered permanent loss of equilibrium while aboard an
international flight and filed suit under the Warsaw Convention
claiming that the plane's pressurization system caused the injury.62
In interpreting the accident provision of article 17, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit agreed with the district court's jury charge
defining accident as an unexpected happening. 63 Relying on War-
shaw, the circuit court concluded that the evidence was insufficient
for a jury to infer that the pressurization system was operating ab-
normally, a prerequisite to holding the carrier liable.64
Six years later, in Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co. 65 the Third Cir-
56 Id. at 410.
57 Id. at 411. Based on this analysis, the district court viewed an accident as an unu-
sual, out of the ordinary event while an occurrence could happen under normal condi-
tions. Id. at 412.
58 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20.
59 Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 412. The court emphasized that an accident would not
encompass injury due to a passenger's health condition that had no relation to the flight
itself. Id. at 412.
60 Id. at 413.
61 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978).
62 DeMarints, 580 F.2d at 1195. The testimony of medical experts established that
rapid decompression contributed to the passenger's injury. Id. at 1197.
63 Id. at 1196. The charge to the jury by the district court was as follows:
An accident is an event, a physical circumstance, which takes place not ac-
cording to the usual course of things. If the event on board an airplane is an
ordinary, expected, and usual occurrence, then it cannot be termed an acci-
dent. To constitute an accident, the occurrence on board the aircraft must
be unusual or unexpected, an unusual or unexpected happening.
Id.
64 Id. at 1197, 1198. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for
a new trial due to procedural errors. The interpretation of the term accident was given as
a guideline to aid the lower court in its new trial. The plaintiffs argument, which the
district court accepted, was that because several passengers experienced discomfort, the
pressurization system was malfunctioning. The circuit court viewed evidence that six out
of 190 passengers experienced some pain to be insufficient to establish abnormality, and
noted that it was equally plausible that the pain resulted from the individuals' peculiar
susceptibilities. Id. at 1197.
65 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1776 (1985).
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cuit again considered the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to
a passenger injury occurring during an international flight. While en
route from Alaska to Japan, the passenger, Stanley Abramson, exper-
ienced a hernia attack.66 Abramson's requested permission to lie
down in order to alleviate the attack67 was denied by a stewardess. 68
Citing DeMarines, the passenger claimed that the airline's refusal to
allow him to lie down was an unusual event causing the aggravation
of his hernia condition.69 Abramson analogized his situation to ter-
rorist attacks, bombings, and hijackings, all of which are treated as
accidents under article 17.70 The court, unpersuaded by this reason-
ing, distinguished Abramson on the ground that it involved an ordi-
nary, routine flight while those other cases did not.7 ' In refusing to
impose liability against Japan Airlines, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that "in the absence of proof of abnormal external
factors, aggravation of a pre-existing injury during the course of a
routine and normal flight" did not meet the requirements of article
17.72 The court viewed external factors in relation to the operation
of the aircraft, not to the acts of airline personnel.
In contrast, the court in Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines7s
found that an event on board an air carrier that caused injury to a
passenger did constitute an accident. 74 After boarding a flight
bound for Athens, Greece the passenger in Chutter left her seat and
went to the rear door of the aircraft to wave goodbye to her daugh-
ter. Unaware that the boarding ramp had just been removed, the
passenger stepped out of the plane and fell to the ground.75 With-
out explicating its reasoning, 76 the court ruled that in this situation,
the accident provision of article 17 had been met.7 7
66 The passenger had "a pre-existing parasophageal hiatal hernia." Id. at 131.
67 In the past, Abramson had been able to ward off these attacks by lying down and
massaging his stomach. Id.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id. at 132.
70 Id. at 132, 133.
71 Id. at 133.
72 Id. Cf. Scherer v. Pan Am. World Airways, 54 A.D.2d 636, 387 N.Y.S.2d 580
(1976) (development of thrombophlebitis as result of sitting on board airplane not injury
caused by accident absent some evidence of turbulence, collision, or unusual event).
73 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
74 Id. at 613.
75 Id. at 612, 613.
76 The language of the opinion seems to indicate that the court defined the term
accident from the passenger's perspective and considered whether an accidental result had
occurred. This is in contrast to most cases which inquire into whether the act causing the
injury (ie., the removal of the ramp) was a departure from the normal mode of the aircraft
operation. The court stated, "Without embarking upon a detailed analysis of the plaintiff's
physical position at the time of her fall, I am satisfied that the accident causing the damage
occurred, within the terms of article 17 of the Convention. ... Id. at 613.
77 Id. Although the situation in this case was covered under article 17, the complaint
was dismissed because the two-year statute of limitations had run and, additionally, the
court found the passenger was contributorily negligent. Id. at 616.
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In addition to interpreting the applicability of the Warsaw Con-
vention to passenger injuries on board an aircraft, courts have also
considered whether this international treaty covers certain injuries
sustained in the air terminal area.78 In McDonald v. Air Canada79 the
passenger, a seventy-four year old woman, sought recovery under
the Warsaw Convention for injuries suffered as a result of a fall in the
baggage area of the terminal.80 The passenger had become mentally
incompetent by the time of the trial and there was no evidence indi-
cating how or why she fell.81 The court found the basis of liability
too tenuous and noted that the injury could just as likely have oc-
curred due to an internal condition of the plaintiff.
8 2
In recent years, courts have broadened the scope of the accident
provision in article 17 to include intentional acts of third parties.83
In doing so, the focus has shifted from the more narrow approach of
whether the happening is an unusual or unexpected change in the
normal operation of an air carrier to a broader inquiry into whether
an unusual event, which may or may not be related to the function-
ing of the carrier, caused the injury.
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.84 the court held that an air-
plane hijacking was an accident and found the carrier liable for pas-
senger injuries as a result of this occurrence.85 This decision was
based on the court's view that proceedings surrounding the Mon-
treal Agreement revealed that the parties intended for a carrier to be
liable to "innocent victims of willful acts by others."'8 6 Additionally,
the court, in examining policy considerations, found the airline to be
in the best position to avoid hijackings, to insure against them, and
to allocate efficiently the costs of such measures.8 7
Other intentional acts, such as terrorist attacks occurring in air
terminals during the course of embarking or disembarking from
78 The applicable portion of article 17 reads: "The carrier shall be liable ... if the
accident which caused the damage. . . took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." (emphasis added) Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 17. For those cases in which the injury occurs in an area other than
within the aircraft, courts must interpret the meaning of the embarking and disembarking
provision. Important factors are situs of the accident, control exercised by the airlines,
and passenger activity. See Day, 528 F.2d at 33.
79 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
80 Id. at 1404.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1404, 1405. The court implied that had there been evidence that the area
was poorly lit and, as a result, the passenger had not seen the bags she fell over, a reason-
able assumption could be made that an accident caused the injury. Id. at 1405.
83 See Matgnie, 549 F.2d at 1259; Day, 528 F.2d at 34.
84 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
85 Id. at 707. See also Karfumkel, 427 F. Supp. at 971; Ktystal, 403 F. Supp. at 1322;
Burnette v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); People cc re/
Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Gilberto, 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977, cert. denied, 441
U.S. 932 (1978).
86 Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at 707.
87 Id.
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planes, have been held to be within the scope of article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. 8 Analogizing to the hijacking cases, courts
have applied broad cost-allocation theories, and in addition, have
recognized that airlines are best able to implement safety measures
to guard against these sieges. 89
Viewed against this background, the Supreme Court ruling in
Air France follows the general trend of lower court decisions inter-
preting the accident clause of Article 17. It is, however, somewhat
inconsistent with the present expectations of parties to the Warsaw
Convention.
A main objective in drafting the Warsaw Convention was to
place limits on a carrier's liability to passengers. 90 The goals of par-
ties to a treaty may be modified over time, however, and subsequent
interpretations are useful to ascertain these changed expectations.9'
As indicated by the Montreal Agreement and Guatemala Protocol,
passenger protection has become an important goal. Increasing em-
phasis has been placed on adequately compensating air travelers for
injuries occuring during international flights. 92 At the same time
there is concern that air carriers not become insurers of all injuries
which befall international travelers. 93 Court decisions reveal an at-
tempt to reconcile these objectives.
In attempting to define the elusive accident provision of article
17, courts have looked to the text of the Convention. Courts have
reasonably concluded that unless the drafters intended for an acci-
dent to mean something more substantial than a mere occurrence,
the same language would have been used in articles 17 and 18.9 As
the Convention presently reads, liability is imposed if an accident
causes injury to a passenger 95 while only an occurrence is required
to recover for damage to baggage.9 6
Consistent with its French legal definition and the negotiating
history of the Convention, courts have defined accident as an unu-
88 See, e.g., Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 152 (injuries resulting from terrorists firing weap-
ons upon group of passengers going through pre-boarding procedures); Day, 528 F.2d at
31 (passengers standing in line to board plane injured by terrorist attack); In re Tel Aviv,
405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975), afd, 545 F.2d 279 (Ist Cir.), ert. denied, 430 U.S. 950
(1976) (passengers attacked by terrorists in baggage area of terminal). Although the
above cases turned on whether the area of attack was within the course of embarking or
disembarking from the plane, the courts specifically noted that terrorist attacks do consti-
tute accidents. But see Martinez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430
U.S. 950 (1977) (terrorist attack in baggage area of terminal not accident because risk of
such violence not peculiar to air travel).
89 See Day, 528 F.2d at 34.
90 Comment, supra note 29, at 658.
91 Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 411.
92 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 40; see also Note, supra note 34, at 148.
9s Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20.
94 Warsaw Convention, suPra note 1, arts. 17, 18.
9s Id. art. 17.
9 Id. art. 18.
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sual, fortuitous, or unexpected external event.9 7 Thus, it has been
held that normal air pressure changes which cause deafness are not
accidents within the meaning of article 17.98 Similarly, courts have
ruled that the aggravation of a pre-existing hernia condition 99 or the
development of phlebitis during an ordinary flight100 are not cov-
ered under the Warsaw Convention. The common thread underly-
ing these cases is that the flights were, in all respects, normal and
routine. These decisions indicate an unwillingness by courts to per-
mit recovery where an individual's peculiar susceptibility interacts
with a normal, external event to cause injury.
The perspective from which a particular court defines the term
accident is of great significance in determining whether recovery will
be granted under the Warsaw Convention. This term has been de-
fined as an unexpected or unusual result of an event. 10 1 Applying this
definition to the cases discussed above, liability would more likely be
imposed on the air carrier because it clearly would be unusual for
one to develop phlebitis from sitting on a plane, or to experience
deafness due to aircraft pressurization. In the Chutter case it appears
that the Southern District of New York interpreted accident in just
this manner. The most logical explanation for imposing liability on
the carrier in Chutter is that the court viewed the falling out of a plane
during a routine flight as an unusual, unexpected result. 10 2 That
case is, however, exceptional. Most courts have followed the text of
article 17 which requires that an accident cause the injury.' 03 In ad-
hering to the rule that the language used in treaty provisions indi-
•cates drafter intent, the interpretation of the accident provision by
the majority of courts would seem to be the proper reference point
for an analysis of article 17.
Additionally, the finding of a causal connection between an acci-
dent and the passenger injury is an essential requirement for impos-
ing liability. 1°4 As illustrated by McDonald, in cases where the
plaintiff is unable to satisfy the burden of proof that an unusual, ex-
ternal event caused the injury, the Warsaw Convention is
97 SeeAir France, 105 S. Ct. at 1343. The Chutter case, 132 F. Supp. at 611, is inconsis-
tent with the general view because it would seem logical that the removal of the ramp from
the aircraft's entrance is a routine operating procedure and, thus, would not constitute an
accident under the Warsaw Convention. The court in Chutter does not articulate its inter-
pretation of the term accident and, therefore, it is difficult to determine the criteria on
which it based this determination. For a possible explanation, see supra note 76 and ac-
companying text.
98 See DeMarines, 580 F.2d at 1197, 1198; Warshaw, 442 F. Supp. at 413.
99 See Abramson, 739 F.2d at 130.
100 See Scherer, 54 A.D.2d at 636, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
101 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1342 (quoting Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., 1903 A.C. 443,
453).
102 See Chutter, 132 F. Supp. at 611.
103 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
104 M. MIME, PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE By AIR 58 (1963).
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inapplicable. 105
The scope of article 17 has been broadened through its applica-
tion to hijackings, terrorist attacks, and bombings. 10 6 Courts have
held that such incidents do constitute accidents, although they are
created by third persons over whom the air carrier has no control.
The courts emphasize that these events are unusual, unexpected,
and out of the ordinary and, therefore, qualify as accidents under
article 17.
The analysis used in cases involving intentional acts of third par-
ties differs, however, from typical article 17 cases in which an acci-
dent is defined in terms of the functioning of the aircraft and air
terminal. This more liberal interpretation of the accident provision,
whereby carriers are held liable for events non related to airline op-
erations, can best be understood in terms of policy considerations.
Courts abhor innocent victims suffering from the intentional wrong-
doing of others. Furthermore, in terms of cost allocation, the view is
that the air carrier can spread the costs of liability over all of its pas-
sengers, and is in the best position to implement safety measures to
reduce the risk of hijackings, bombings, or terrorist attacks.' 0 7
Applying the above standards to Air France, there was no ex-
traordinary, unusual event that caused the passenger's injury. The
aircraft's pressurization system was operating normally during the
plane's descent. Thus, even if the pressure changes caused deafness
in a passenger who was unusually sensitive, recovery could not be
granted under article 17, as this provision of the Warsaw Convention
is presently interpreted by the majority of courts.
The increasing emphasis on passenger protection as reflected in
the Montreal Agreement and Guatemala Protocol illustrates that par-
ties to a treaty can change their expectations regarding a pact. The
amended language of article 17 exemplified in the Guatemala Proto-
col reveals a desire by signatory countries to impose liability on carri-
ers for all events which cause injury to passengers.' 0 8 Although this
Protocol lacks the force of law, it is a useful indication of the intent of
the contracting parties.109 Moreover, air transportation has become
an extremely safe mode of travel, resulting in very reasonable insur-
ance rates for air carriers." 0
The relative stability of the airline industry coupled with a
strong desire to compensate travelers for injuries provides a forceful
impetus for a re-examination of cases such as Air France, in which an
105 McDonald, 439 F.2d at 1405.
106 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
107 Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at 707.
108 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20.
109 Topical Survey, supra note 50, at 286.
I 10 Bosco, Application of Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement in Regard to What Is an
"Accidea," TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 223 (1984).
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event related to air travel causes passenger injury. The same policy
considerations used to impose liability on carriers for injuries result-
ing from hijackings, bombings, or terrorist attacks are applicable to
situations in which an occurrence related to the operation of the car-
rier causes injury to a traveler. The rationale for liability in such in-
stances may, in fact, be stronger in that it makes more sense to hold
an air carrier responsible for acts directly related to the functioning
of the aircraft than for intentional acts by third parties, which bear no
logical relationship to such operation.
In terms of social justice, it is likely that the injured passenger is
least able to bear the cost of the injury. If the air traveler is unable to
establish a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention, the only
remaining remedy is a negligence claim, where the chances of recov-
ery are slim, unless a breach of duty of care can be proven.,"
Under a cost allocation theory, the air carrier is best able to ob-
tain insurance against injuries and to spread the cost of liability over
all of its passengers." 12 The Supplemental Compensation Plan, ap-
proved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, demonstrates how an air car-
rier could provide adequate compensation for passenger injury
through risk spreading. Under this plan, international air travelers
contribute two dollars and fifty cents per ticket as insurance against
injuries. The money is placed into a fund underwritten by an insur-
ance company and used, in appropriate situations, to compensate
travelers." 13
Additionally, the carrier is in the best position to implement
measures to prevent injuries. Evidence does indicate, however, that
in a situation such as that posed in Air France, the airline is not tech-
nologically able to alter the pressurization system to avoid risks of
passenger injuries. 1 4 Nevertheless, in view of the inequity of requir-
ing the passenger to bear the cost and the feasibility of carriers ob-
taining reasonable insurance rates, on balance, it seems more fair
that liability should be imposed on the carrier.
These policy reasons for allowing recovery under article 17
would not be contrary to the intent of the Warsaw Convention. No
liability would be imposed if there did not exist a causal connection
between an external event and injury to the passenger. Injury
caused solely by a passenger's health condition would not be covered
under article 17, as such an event could just as likely have occurred
elsewhere. This would ensure that the carrier would not become the
absolute insurer of all mishaps involving passengers, a predicament
I I Note, supra note 28, at 369.
112 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 599-600.
113 Comment, supra note 29, at 679, 681.
114 Bosco, supm note 110, at 223.
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sought to be avoided by the drafters of the Guatemala Protocol."15
Finally, because the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement places monetary limits on a carrier's liability," 6 passen-
ger injuries caused by an event related to air travel could be compen-
sated for under the treaty and still satisfy the drafters' intent to limit
carrier liability.
In Air France Justice O'Connor set forth the standard by which
courts should interpret the accident clause in article 17 of the War-
saw Convention. She suggested a totality of circumstances approach
in which only a single link in a causal chain of events need be "an
unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger." 117
Although this indicates a desire by the Supreme Court to construe
broadly article 17, the decision does not go far enough. In light of
the relatively prosperous state of the airline industry, the important
goal of adequate passenger compensation, and the unfairness of re-
quiring travelers to bear the cost of injuries related to air transporta-
tion, article 17 of the Warsaw Convention should be interpreted to
include any events connected with air travel that cause passenger
injuries.
-LAURIE S. TRUESDELL
115 See supra note 49.
116 Montreal Agreement, supra note 40.
117 Air France, 105 S. Ct. at 1346.
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